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STATE SECRETS ARE A PRIVILEGE, NOT A
RIGHT: CAN FOREIGN VICTIMS OF
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION AND TORTURE
OVERCOME THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
USING THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Torture: Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a personfor such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishinghim for an act he or a thirdperson has committed or is suspected
of having committed, or intimidatingor coercing him or a thirdperson, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.It does not include pain or suffering arisingonly from, inherent in
or incidental to lawful sanctions.
United Nations Convention Against Torture, Article 1.1
I continue to believe that brutal methods of interrogation are
inconsistent with our values, undermine the rule of law, and are not
effective means of obtaining information. They alienate the United States
from the world, and serve as a recruitment and propaganda tool for
terrorists. They increase the will of our enemies to fight against us, and
endangerour troops when they are captured. The United States will not use
or supportthese methods.
President Barack Obama on the International Day in Support of
Victims of Torture, June 26, 2010
At the time of his abduction, Binyam Mohamed was a twentyeight-year-old Ethiopian citizen and legal resident of the United Kingdom.'
United States officials arrested him in Pakistan on immigration charges and
transported him to Morocco, shackled and blindfolded, while wearing a
diaper and overalls.2 After placing him in Moroccan custody, agents

I
2

Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Afohamed H), 579 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 949-50.
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routinely beat him to the point of breaking his bones.3 While blindfolded,
he was forced to listen to loud music for hours at a time. 4 Most
disturbingly, Mohamed was cut with a scalpel all over his body, including
his penis, while authorities poured a "hot, stinging liquid" into his open
wounds.5 He was subsequently transferred back to American authorities
and transported to Afghanistan, where he was forced to listen to the
screams of women and children for twenty-four hours per day. 6 Officials
eventually transferred him to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and held him for
.7
nearly five years.
While the policy of rendition has existed as a counterterrorism tool
since the Clinton administration, President Bush expanded the program to
its current state.8 The legality of the program, as well as legal violations in
its pursuit, have thus far been insulated by the executive branch's use of the
state secrets privilege. 9 The privilege is an evidentiary privilege that0
existed in common law and has evolved into a formalized judicial inquiry.'
Mohamed's abduction is merely one story among countless others
who have suffered similar treatment since September 11, 2001.11 That

3 Id. at 949.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 950.
6 Mohamed II, 579

F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2009).

7 Id.

8 See

Robert Johnson, Note, ExtraordinaryRendition: A Wrong WithoutA Right, 43 U. RICH.

L. REV. 1135, 1139-41 (2009) (examining evolution of extradition procedures). While rendition
extradition is not a novel concept, using it as a national security measure began in the latter half
of the twentieth century. Id. at 1138. When the United States started engaging Al-Qaeda in the
mid-1990s, President Clinton directed the CIA to turn over terrorist suspects to foreign
governments with existing legal processes for them. Id. at 1139. This program permitted the
United States to return terrorist suspects and allow foreign governments to interrogate, try, and
sentence them. Id. at 1140. After September 11, 2001, President Bush authorized an expansion
of the rendition program. Id. This expansion included two important components: (1) the CIA
no longer needed case-by-case approval from the State Department, White House, or Justice
Department; and (2) renditions no longer required the terrorist suspect to be wanted in connection
with a particular crime. Id. at 1141.
9 See Rita Glasionov, Note, In Furtherance of Transparency and Litigants' Rights:
Reforming the State Secrets Privilege, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 458, 471 (2009) (arguing

privilege's contemporary application results in plaintiff routinely losing before reaching merits of
case). Glasionov further argues the courts have applied the privilege as a presumption favoring
governmental secrecy. Id. at 486.

10 See generally Michael H. Page, Note, Judging Without the Facts: A Schematic for
Reviewing State Secrets Privilege Claims, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1243, 1247-53 (2008) (describing
evolution of state secrets privilege).
11 See, e.g., Mfohamed I, 579 F.3d 943, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing claims of four
other plaintiffs in case); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing
plaintiff's allegations of kidnapping, transport, and torture); Aar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d
250, 253-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) (alleging kidnapping and
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day's events not only fundamentally changed the global paradigm in which

the United States functioned, the events also provoked the Bush
administration and Congress to "take the gloves off' when it came to
interrogating terrorist suspects. 12 Since President Barack Obama's election
in November 2008, the United States aggressively continues to assert the
state secrets privilege despite its stated policies to the contrary.13 These
alterations in domestic and foreign policy, however, have radical and farreaching legal implications that still have yet to be fully realized. 14 The
executive branch and the national security infrastructure, firmly opposed to
public scrutiny of its counter-terrorism operations, have repeatedly asserted
the state secrets privilege not to safeguard information vital to national
security, but to prevent plaintiffs from seeking any legal recourse."

torture at U.S. and foreign officials' hands).

12 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1140 (citing Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community
Activities Before and After the TerroristAttacks of September 1], 2001: Hearing Before the J.
Inquiry of S. Select Comm. on Intelligence and H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence,

107th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2002) (testimony of Dir. Cofer Black, CIA Counterterrorist Center)).
13 See Memorandum from the Attorney General to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts. and Agencies,
"Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege" (Sept. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Holder memo] (available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secretprivileges.pdf). The Holder memo aims to provide "greater accountability and reliability in the
invocation of the state secrets privilege in litigation." Id. at 1. These new standards were
proposed to "strengthen public confidence that the U.S. Government will invoke the privilege in
court only when genuine and significant harm to national defense or foreign relations is at stake
and only to the extent necessary to safeguard those interests." Id. According to the Holder
memo, the Department of Justice will invoke the state secrets privilege in areas involving
classified information. Id. When dealing with classified information, the Obama administration
will assert the state secrets privilege when the unauthorized disclosure "reasonably could be
expected to cause significant harm" to national security. Id. For information that is nonpublic
but not classified, the United States will assert the privilege using the same standard. Id. The
administration will do so with narrow tailoring, "only to the extent necessary to protect against
the risk of significant harm to national security." Id. The Holder memo explicitly states the
administration will not assert the privilege "in order to: (i) conceal violations of the law,
inefficiency, or administrative error." Id. at 2; see also Spencer S. Hsu, Obama Invokes 'State
Secrets' Claim to Dismiss Suit Against Targeting of US. Citizen al-Aulaqi, WASH. POST, Sept.
25, 2010 (available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/25/
AR2010092500560.html).
14 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1160 (noting United States and its agents "largely insulated
themselves from accountability" for extraordinary rendition program). The legal maneuvers
involved have resulted in extraordinary rendition plaintiffs facing "unrealistic obstacles" in
bringing suit against the U.S. Id. at 1166; see also Jason A. Crook, From the Civil War to the
War on Terror: The Evolution and Application of the State Secrets Privilege, 72 ALB. L. REv. 57,

77 (2009) (noting privilege has "potential to radically alter the scope of litigation available to
aggrieved parties"). Prospectively, the very existence of the privilege may have a chilling effect
on future litigation. Id.
15 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1166 (describing effect of Court's invocation of political
question doctrine and executive branch assertion of privilege). Thus far, the United States has
prevented any legal claim arising from extraordinary rendition. Id. (emphasis added).
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This Note will explore whether individuals who have been
abducted under the U.S. extraordinary rendition policy, and subjected to
severe interrogation methods by both U.S. and foreign officials, have a
remedy under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"). 16 Part II will explore the
factual and procedural history of Mohamed's suit, and Part III will examine
whether the ATS still provides a meaningful enforcement mechanism after
lying dormant for nearly 180 years. 17 Part III will also examine the context
in which the state secrets privilege arose, and compare it with factual
situations such as the one presented in Mohamed 1.1 8 Finally, Part IV will
argue for a narrow application of the state secrets privilege to counter its
frequent use by the executive branch in cases where either foreign nationals
or U.S. citizens are taken by extraordinary rendition and tortured.19 The
recent ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States denying certiorari
in Arar v. Ashcrof 20 in addition to the Ninth Circuit's decision en banc in
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,Inc. 21 have, as of this moment, denied an
entire class harmed by the U.S. government from pursuing a judicial
remedy.22
II. MOHAMED V JEPPESENDATAPLAN, INC.: A SHELL GAME OF
RESPONSIBILITY
This Note explores the confluence of international law, federal
statute, and national security. 23 The plaintiffs' allegations in the Mohamed
cases, excruciating though they may be in their catalogue of human rights
abuses, offer a guide to navigating the complexities inherent in such an
expansive study. 24 In the Mohamed cases, the five plaintiffs allegedly
suffered disparate-but schematically similar-treatment at the hands of
both the U.S. and foreign governments. 25 The plaintiffs sought a remedy
16 See infra note 49 (citing text of ATS).

17 See infra Part III(B) (analyzing ATS's evolution and contemporary application).
18 See infra Part III (examining whether plaintiffs' claim in Afohamed I should be barred by
state secrets privilege).
19 See infra Parts IV-V (stating analysis and conclusion).
20 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
21 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Alohamed II1),
614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
22 See Crook, supra note 14, at 77 (warning future litigants of courts' willingness to bar
claims based on privilege).
23 See supra PartI (introducing Note).
24 See Afohamed II, 579 F.3d 943, 951-53 (9th Cir. 2009) (categorizing factual claims and

legal elements of case).

25 See id. at 949-50 (describing each plaintiffs treatment). Swedish authorities captured
Plaintiff Agiza, an Egyptian national, and transferred him to American custody. Id. at 949.
Authorities flew him to Egypt, held him for five weeks in a windowless cell, and beat him
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under the ATS for harms suffered during their rendition and subsequent
interrogations.2 6 After filing a complaint against Jeppesen, a corporation
the plaintiffs asserted transported them during the rendition process, the
U.S. government intervened as a defendant and obtained a dismissal from
the federal district court.2 7 The government asserted the state secrets
privilege, and without the protected information, the plaintiffs had no
justiciable action. 28 However, on appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's decision for further
examination.29
Before further examination in the district court occurred, the entire
Ninth Circuit granted an en banc rehearing to determine whether the
plaintiffs' action could be dismissed.30 Though the Mohamed II court
voted unanimously to reverse and remand the case, the decision in

severely. Id. They also shocked him using electrodes attached to his ear lobes, nipples, and
genitals. Id. Authorities detained Plaintiff Agiza for two-and-a-half years, gave him a six-hour
trial, and sentenced him to fifteen years in Egyptian prison. Id. Plaintiff Britel is an Italian citizen
of Moroccan origin detained by Pakistani officials and eventually transferred to American
custody. Id. American officials dressed him in a diaper and overalls, shackled him, and
blindfolded him during the flight to Morocco. Id. Once in Moroccan prison, "he was beaten,
deprived of sleep and food, and threatened with sexual torture." Id. at 950. Authorities released
Britel, re-detained him, and sentenced him to fifteen years in Moroccan prison. Id. Plaintiff
Mohamed, an Ethiopian citizen who resided legally in the United Kingdom, was detained in
Pakistan and also flown to Morocco. Id. While in Moroccan custody: officials brutally tortured
Mohamed, beat him until he sustained broken bones; cut his penis with a scalpel; poured a "hot
stinging liquid" on his wounds; and blindfolded and handcuffed him day and night. Id. (citations
omitted). After transfer to CIA custody, he underwent further torture, including detainment in
total darkness and he was subjected to recorded screams of women and children for twenty -four
hours per day. Id. Furthermore, he was starved. Id. Eventually he was transferred to the
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, detention facility, where he remained for five years. Id. Authorities
arrested Plaintiff al-Rawi, an Iraqi citizen and legal resident of Great Britain, in Gambia. Id.
Authorities placed him in a diaper and overalls and shackled him for his transportation. Id. Kept
in the same "dark prison" as Mohamed, Plaintiff al-Rawi was deprived of sleep in the same
manner. Id. (citation omitted). Authorities transferred him to Bagram Air Force Base, where he
was beaten, deprived of sleep, and threatened with death. Id. He suffered the same treatment
upon his subsequent transport to Guantanamo Bay, where he remained until his release back to
Great Britain. Id. Finally, Plaintiff Bashmilah is a Yemeni citizen whom Jordanian agents
detained while he visited his sick mother. Id. Transferred to U.S. custody in Afghanistan,
Plaintiff al-Rawi was placed in solitary confinement in twenty-four hour darkness. Id. He was
then moved to a cell where he was subjected to twenty-four-hour light and loud noise. Id. He
attempted suicide three times. Id. Eventually, a Yemeni court convicted him of a trivial crime
and released him. Id.
26 See Mohamed II, 579 F. 3d at 951-52 (describing procedural posture of case).
27 Id.
28 See infra Part III (discussing effect of successful state secrets privilege claim).
29 See Mfohamed H, 579 F.3d 943, 962 (9th Cir. 2009), aff'd, Mohamed III, 614 F.3d 1070
(9th Cir. 2010).
30 See Mohamed 111, 614 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Mohamed III was a 6-5 decision voting to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims. 3'
All three judges who presided over Mohamed II dissented in Mohamed
32
111.
The ruling was both substantively and strategically significant.3 3 The
decision in Mohamed III eliminated the split between the Fourth and Ninth
Circuit on whether the privilege can be used at the outset of a case to
achieve dismissal under the Reynolds doctrine.3 4 However, the lack of a
circuit split decreases the likelihood that the United States35 Supreme Court
will grant certiorari to determine the proper interpretation.
III. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, U.S.
FEDERAL COURTS, AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
A. ContemporaryInternationalLegal Norms
In a global environment where information technology, economies
of scale, and a decreased emphasis on sovereignty have created a more
connected and more mobile human experience, international law remains
an enigma-difficult both to define and to enforce. 36 Since the end of

31

Id. at 1072.

32 Id.
33 See Lyle Denniston, "'Rendition" Challenge Scuttled, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 8, 2010,
9:37
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/09/rendition-challenge-scuttled (noting decision raises
prospect courts may never rule on CIA's rendition program).
34 See infa notes 147-151 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Afohamed III
decision); see also Lyle Denniston, State Secrets Doctrine Narrowed, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 28,
2009, 6:16PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/04/state-secrets-doctrine-narrowed (describing
nature of circuit split between Fourth and Ninth Circuit).
35 See Denniston, supra note 34 (analyzing whether Supreme Court will hear case).
Denniston notes that while the decision in Afohamed III will most likely be appealed, the outcome
of that decision, coupled with the El-Afasri decision, "goes far toward insulating the 'rendition'
program from judicial review- unless the Supreme Court took on that case and reversed the
result." Id. Currently, the Court is consolidating two cases, General Dynamics Corp. v. United
States, 2010 WL 1698039 (pet. for writ of certiorari), and Boeing Co. v. United States, 2010 WL
1698042 (pet. for writ of certiorari), to determine whether the government improperly asserted the
state secrets privilege, and in so doing prevented the defense contractors from defending
themselves against government claims that they breached contracts with the government. See
also Lyle Denniston, A Review of "State Secrets", SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 28, 2010, 10:26AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/09/a-review-of-state-secrets/
'.(discussing cases for which
Supreme Court granted certiorari for October 2010 term).
36 See Debra A. Harvey, Comment, The Alien Tort Statute: International Human Rights
Watchdog or Simply 'HistoricalTrivia '?,21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 341, 344 n.19 (1988) (citing
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159 (1820)). Harvey cites Chief Justice Story's
opinion where he noted an "explicit definition of the Law of Nations was almost impossible
because [o]ffences, too, against the law of nations, cannot, with any accuracy, be said to be
completely ascertained and defined in any public code decognized by the common consent of
nations."' Id.; see also Hari M. Osofsky, Article, EnvironmentalHuman Rights Under the Alien
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World War II, a hierarchy of norms have emerged so that various
human
37
rights infractions can at least be categorized, if not prosecuted.
The most fundamental of international law norms is Customary
International Law ("CIL"). 3" To be classified as part of the CIL, the norm
must arise "from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation."3 9 It is, then, those norms of human
behavior by which all nations must feel constrained and bound in their

treatment of citizens. 40 However, even at this fundamental level, there is
yet a more restrictive subset termed jus cogens .41 Although CIL requires
only general acceptance by the international community, jus cogens is held
to a higher standard.42 While a CIL norm requires many states to accept it
as such, jus cogens encompasses those norms from which no nation can
44 the first
deviate without violating them.43 In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
modern American case in which international law is discussed, the court
determined that for a suit to be brought under the ATS, the violation must
be one of CIL.45 Since then, however, there has been a trend among federal
courts requiring a violation of jus cogens to state a cause of action under
the ATS .46 While this trend is more restrictive than proponents of

Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 335, 348-49 (1997) (describing elusiveness of clear definition for
"international law"). Osofsky writes that while "courts and scholars have spilt much ink
explaining the content of [international law's] definition, its exact nature remains quite unclear."
Supra, at 348-49.
37 See Joshua Ratner, Note, Back to the Future: Why a Return to the Approach of the
Filartiga Court is Essentialto Preserve the Legitimacy and Potential of the Alien Tort ClaimsAct,
35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 90 (2002) (discussing evolution of international law). Ratner
notes the Nuremburg Tribunals presented "a marked departure from traditional notions of State
sovereignty and individual rights under international law." Id.
38 See Osofsky, supra note 36, at 348 (explaining CIL norms as general, consistent practices
viewed by states as law).
39 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2)

(1987).
See Ratner, supra note 37, at 85 (discussing CIL). Ratner notes that sovereign states must
not only generally abide by a given norm, but also must feel accountable to other nations and
international consensus to maintain said norm. Id.
41 See id. at 85 (classifyingjus cogens as "narrow subset" of CIL).
42 See id. (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698-99
40

(May 23, 1969)). Ratner cites Article 53 definingjus cogens norms as "accepted and recognized
by the international community of states as a whole . . . from which no derogation is
permitted .... Id.(citation omitted).
43 See id.(distinguishing CIL andjus cogens).
44 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
45 See id. at 884-85 (holding torture prohibited by Law of Nations, thus meeting
jurisdictional requirement for ATS).
46 See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Nat'l Coal.
Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beanal v.
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international law would like, it has allowed the courts time to fully
conceptualize the ramifications of incorporating international law into
domestic law.4 Though there may be some debate as to what tortious
actions constitute violations of CIL but not jus cogens, torture, as defined
in the United Nations Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), is undoubtedly
ajus cogens offense.48

B. Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute (also known as the "Alien Tort Claims
Act") grants original jurisdiction to federal district courts when a foreign
national files a complaint against a person or entity for committing a tort in
violation of the Law of Nations . 49 Enacted as part of the 1789 Judiciary
Act, this one-sentence statute likely carries with it a far different meaning
today than its drafters intended.5° Eighteenth century legal thinkers
regarded the "Law of Nations" as those laws which all civilized people
were bound to uphold."i In essence, the Law of Nations is no more than

Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D. La. 1997); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995); see also Ratner, supra note 37, at 85 (citing aforementioned
cases as limiting actionable ATS claims to "narrow subset of the CIL of human rights").
47 See William S. Dodge, Which Torts in Violation of the Law of Nations?, 24 HASTINGS
& CoMP. L. REV. 351, 352-53 (2001) (arguing for expansive reading of ATS). Dodge
notes that because jurisprudence has evolved to be more positivist, "modem courts feel less
comfortable 'creating' international law," id. at 353, and that subsequently "[i]t is as hard to
justify limiting jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute to jus cogens norms as it is to justify
limiting the Statute to rules that are 'universal, definable, and obligatory."' Id. at 357-58.
48 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883 (discussing torture's place within Law of Nations). The
INT'L

court stated with regard "to the act of torture, we have little difficulty discerning its universal
renunciation in the modem usage and practice of nations." Id. at 883; see also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 39, at § 702 cmt. n (listing torture as jus cogens norm).
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.").
50 See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United
States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26, 34-46 (1952) (discussing founders' attitudes toward Law of
Nations). Dickinson notes the Law of Nations was embodied in the Declaration of Independence,
which he argues was a set of legal principles. Id. at 34-35. He notes that the Declaration's
language claiming the "'[f]ull power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish
commerce, and to do all other acts and things which Independent States may of right do' came
straight from that universal jurisprudence." Id. at 35 (citation omitted).
51 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 66 (1769) (describing Law of Nations).
Blackstone wrote "the Law of Nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and
established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world," but sovereign
legislative acts implementing these rules "are not to be considered as introductive of any new
rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom; without
which it must cease to be a part of the civilized world." Id.
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the doctrinal common law.5 2 UnitedStates v. Smith53 was the first and only
time in 165 years that the Supreme Court grappled with the Law of
Nations. 54 While American jurisprudence avoided confrontation with the
Alien Tort Statute, international law grew into an entity with far more
doctrinal breadth than it had possessed in the late eighteenth century.55

In 1980, after the ATS laid dormant for a century and a half, a
Paraguayan family brought suit against a member of the Paraguayan
government in the Filartigacase. 56 The plaintiffs, a husband and wife,
sued the defendant claiming that he kidnapped and tortured their son,
resulting in his death. 57 The alleged kidnapping and torture took place in
Paraguay, but the defendant was living in the United States on a visitor's
visa.58 The district court dismissed the case, asserting that the plaintiff

52

See Dickinson, supra note 50, at 32 (noting "the Law of Nations was part of the law of

England.").
53 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
54 See id. at 162 (discussing whether piracy violated Law of Nations). In looking at the
Law
of Nations, Chief Justice Story wrote that "itis manifest from the language of Sir William
Blackstone, in his comments on piracy, that he considered the common law definition as
distinguishable in no essential respect from that of the law of nations." Id.
55 See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (defining purpose of the United Nations). The Charter
of
the United Nations ("the Charter") was signed on June 26, 1945, and took effect upon its
ratification by the original members: the Republic of China; France; the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and the United
States of America. Id. at art. 110, para. 3. One purpose of the U.N. is to "maintain international
peace and security, and to that end ...bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace .....
Id. at art. 1, para. 1;see also id. at art.
55 (stating "U.N. shall promote .. .universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.");
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, December 10, 1948 ("No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment."); U.N. Convention Against
Torture, art. 1.1, February 4, 1985 (defining torture). This section requires each signatory to the
treaty to ensure that torture victims have a forum for redress and an "enforceable right to fair and
adequate compensation ....
" Id. at art. 14.1, 15.1 (requiring signatories "[to] ensure that any
statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as
evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the
statement was made."); Ratner, supra note 38, at 92 (noting U.N.'s prolific production of
documents has "expanded the general corpus of international law.").
56 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-80 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing
nature of
lawsuit); Eric Gruzen, Comment, The United States as a Forum for Human Rights Litigation: Is
this the Best Solution?, 14 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 207, 214-15 (2001) (describing arrest of

Paraguayan defendant).
57 See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878-79.

See Karen E. Holt, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala After Ten Years: Major Breakthrough or Legal
Oddity?, 20 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 543, 543-44 (1990) (describing case facts). The victim's
58

father, Dr. Joel Filartiga, was a vocal critic of the Paraguayan government. Id. The Filartiga
family alleged that Joelito, the son, was kidnapped by Pena-Irala, the Inspector General of Police
in their region, and tortured to death in retaliation for Dr. Filartiga's opposition to government
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lacked federal jurisdiction.5 9 However, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the case to district court.60 With one
decision, the appellate court breathed new life into a dormant doctrine and
forced the federal courts to begin sifting through foreign nationals' claims
to determine whether they had jurisdiction over actions by, at the outer61
limits, non-U.S. citizens against non-U.S. citizens, on foreign soil.
Though the court in Filartiga attempted to keep its holding narrow, the
implication was clear: violations of fundamental international law could
now be litigated in U.S. federal courts. 62
Over the next twenty-five years, the courts would hear several

cases brought under the auspices of the ATS.63 One of those cases, TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 64 demonstrated the distinct judicial
viewpoints regarding international law's applicability to the United States,
and foreshadowed the domestic separation-of-powers questions piqued by a

policy. Id. Joelito was found dead of cardiac arrest, caused by electric shock treatment. See
Gruzen, supra note 56, at 215.
59 See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 880 (noting district court decision).
60 See id. at 889 (holding federal jurisdiction under ATS may be exercised over plaintiffs'
claim). In reaching this decision, the court thoroughly examined the meaning of the Law of
Nations both during the early period of U. S. jurisprudence and in contemporary times. See id.at
880-90. The court asserted that at the very least, the Law of Nations prohibited torture, and that
"the international community has come to recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant
disregard of basic human rights .....Id. at 890.
61 See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 890; see also id.at 888 (noting outer limits of ATS). The court
opined that hypothetically, the ATS would not confer jurisdiction over a "Luxembourgeois
international investment trust's suit for fraud, conversion and corporate waste." Filartiga,630
F.2d at 888.
62 See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 887-88 (discussing ATS jurisdiction). The court noted that the
Law of Nations covers only norms where "mutual, and not merely several" agreement exists
among nations, and that it is only those norms that fall within the ATS. Id. at 888; see also
Gruzen, supra note 56, at 216-17 (summarizing significance of Filartigaruling). Gruzen noted
three distinct, significant aspects of the ruling. Jd. at 216. First, torture, and more generally,
human rights violations, fell within the Law of Nations. Id. at 216. Second, the ATS was the
proper statute under which to bring human rights violations. Id. Finally, that torture violated
customary international law. Id. But cf Holt, supra note 58, at 549-54 (discussing criticism of
Filartigadecision). Some commentators doubted Filartiga'scentral holding torture violates
customary international law based on the fact that so many nations still practiced it, and thus it
could not be considered universally outlawed. Id. at 550. Others criticized the decision for taking
non-binding treaties (for example, the U.N. Convention Against Torture) and elevating them into
binding law. Id. at 550-57. Lastly, some commentators worried that this decision would
negatively impact U.S. foreign policy, both because it would be morally imperialistic, and also
because it would create friction with allies who practiced torture. Id. at 551.
63 See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand E.Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.
1995) (alleging cause of action under ATS); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1992)
(initiating cause of action for violating ATS); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (using ATS as basis for claim).
64 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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plaintiffs invocation of international law. 65 The case involved plaintiffs
who survived an armed attack on a civilian bus by the paramilitary
Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO"). 66 The plaintiffs brought suit67
against the PLO in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
The three judges empanelled to hear the case each wrote a concurring
opinion explaining their denial of jurisdiction.68 Judge Edwards noted the
Filartigacourt's emphasis on the ATS's narrow construction, and reasoned
that this act did not fall into the category of harms that the Filartigacourt
elucidated.69
In his concurring opinion, Judge Bork reasoned that the phrase

"Law of Nations," as embodied in the statute, referred to a concept far0

different than the modern twentieth century international law paradigm. 7

As such, he noted that the statute was obsolete, or, were the statute still to
retain some vitality, it would be narrowly limited only to those acts
originally considered illegal or tortious in 1789.71 Furthermore, Judge Bork

65
66
67
68
69

See id. at 775 (affirming district court decision, but for three separate reasons).
See id. at 776 (describing facts in complaint).
See id. (outlining procedural posture of case).
See id.at 775 (noting three concurring opinions).
See Tel-Oren v.Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,

concurring) (reasoning that ATS is not applicable to factual situation in instant case). Judge
Edwards reasoned that the Law of Nations has never been viewed as creating statutory
requirements for domestic law, and that doing so would be unworkable. Id. As a result, he notes
that requiring an international consensus on a right to sue is at odds with the method of statutory
interpretation constructing a statute to avoid rendering any portion of it "inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant." Id. (citation omitted). He also noted this logic did not apply
to treaties, suggesting that a violation of an international treaty would create a cause of action
under the ATS. Id. at n.2; see also Holt, supra note 58, at 557 (describing Edwards' reasoning).
Judge Edwards agreed with the Filartiga court, but thought the instant claim was not proper
under the ATS, as it "alleged acts by persons operating outside the dictates of international law."
Id.; see Gruzen, supra note 56, at 218 (noting Edwards' belief that under ATS, international law
applied only to actions by sovereign state).
70 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 811 (Bork, J., concurring) (critiquing appellants' argument). Judge
Bork found that appellants' argument confused the dichotomous meaning of common law. Id.
He reasoned that while the term has referred to common law, traceable to medieval England, it
also refers to non-statutory or constitutional law. Id. Judge Bork believed amalgamating
international law into federal common law, while it is nonstatutory, is entirely distinct from
positing that, "[un]like the common law of contract and tort ... by itself it affords individuals the
right to ask for judicial relief" Id.; see also Allison J. Flom, Note, Human Rights Litigation
Under the Alien Tort Statute: Is the Forti v. Suarez-Mason Decision the Last of its Kind?, 10 B.C.

THIRD WORLD L.J. 321, 330 (1990) (discussing Judge Bork's reasoning). Judge Bork disagreed
with Judge Edwards' reasoning regarding whether private causes for actions were implied in the
ATS language. Flom, supra, at 330. Such a construction would contradict both the drafters'
intent and the proper role of courts in foreign policy. Id.
71 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813 (noting types of offenses drafters may have intended to
include within ATS). Judge Bork looks to Blackstone's Commentaries to deduce three main
offenses: (1) Violation of safe-conducts; (2) Infringements on the rights of ambassadors; and (3)
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reasoned that to find a cause of action where he saw none existing would
usurp the separation of powers doctrine, as embodied in the act of state
doctrine.
Judge Robb, the third judge on the panel, addressed the separation
of powers issue by invoking the political question doctrine, as well as by
noting the impracticability of making a U.S. district court a de facto
international tribunal.73 Judge Robb sided more closely with Judge Bork's
view that the statute should be allowed to fade into the depths of the federal

Piracy. See id. at 813-14; see also Blackstone, supra note 51, at 66 (describing further
Blackstone's definition of "Law of Nations"). Judge Bork also cites Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution as giving Congress the power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
on the high Seas and Offences against the Law of Nations." Tel Oren, 726 F.2d at 814 (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). He also cites Article III, section 2, giving the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction over "all Cases [sic] affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls." Id.
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
72 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799 (Bork, J., concurring) (explaining rationale for dismissing
case). Judge Bork admits in reaching his conclusion that he was "guided chiefly by separation of
powers principles." Id. He notes that the act of state doctrine prevents courts from deciding
whether foreign nations' acts are valid or not. Id. at 802. He further writes that while originally
this doctrine focused on issues of state sovereignty, it has more recently focused on concerns "for
preserving the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of
powers." Id. (citations omitted). As such, Judge Bork reasoned that to view the ATS as granting
both jurisdiction and a cause of action, the international community would come to "justly" view
the United States "not as a nation magnanimously refereeing international disputes, but as an
officious interloper and an international busybody." Id. at 821; see also Harvey, supra note 36, at
351 (describing Judge Bork's opinion). Judge Bork contended that the statute ignored explicit
constitutional divisions in the area of foreign affairs, and that allowing suits of this nature to
proceed would ignore the drafters' intentions, as it would have created international tensions a
young nation would have desired to avoid. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 821-22; Holt, supra note 58, at
558.
73 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). Judge Robb noted that a tort action
must have agreement on both the action at issue and the standards by which it must be judged.
Id. Judge Robb opined that as such, federal courts do not have the proper vantage point from
which to determine the international status of terrorist attacks. Id.; see also Flom, supra note 70,
at 329 (analyzing Tel-Oren decision). Flom notes Judge Robb did not address the ATS's
construction, but instead Robb reasoned international political terrorism, as presented in the
instant case, was a nonjusticiable political question. Id. Judge Robb reasoned that issues of this
nature should be deferred to the executive branch. Id.; see also Holt, supra note 58, at 559
(discussing Tel-Oren concurring opinions); Harvey, supra note 36, at 351 (describing Judge
Robb's approach as "pragmatic" due to difficulty of court's role as fact-finder); Harvey concludes
Judge Robb feared courts would become no more than a professorial debating court, and
consequently they would become overwhelmed by problems of this nature. Id.;
see Tel-Oren,
726 F.2d at 826 (Robb, J., concurring) (considering impact of granting jurisdiction under ATS);
Holt, supra, at 559. Looking at ruling in an alternative manner, whereby foreign nationals would
have jurisdiction under the ATS, Judge Robb noted "[i]t is not implausible that every alleged
victim of violence . . . in such places as Nicaragua and Afghanistan could argue just as
compellingly as the plaintiffs here do, that they are entitled to their day in the courts of the United
States." Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 826 (Robb, J., concurring).
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code, never to be heard from again.74 In response to Judge Bork's opinion
and a fear that the ATS would open a Pandora's Box of burdensome
legal76
75
claims, Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act

in 1992.

While this Act purported to eliminate judges' needs to further define
international law's role in American jurisprudence, key differences
between the ATS and the Torture Victim Protection Act make the ATS a
more viable option under which to bring torture and extraordinary rendition
claims. 77
In the cases of Forti v. Suarez-Mason78 and Kadic v. Karadzic79
courts laid the foundation for ATS claims centered on international
terrorism. 0 The Forti case arose after a military takeover in Argentina.S
Soldiers acting under the commanding general, Suarez-Mason, detained the
plaintiff and his family after they debarked from an airplane. 2 The
74 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 827 (Robb, J., concurring) (discussing evolution of ATS).

Judge Robb writes that to take an ambiguous, two-hundred-year-old statute and inject it into
sensitive matters of international law would be to give the statute a new life, separate from that
which the drafters intended. Id. He notes that to do so would cause the statute not to evolve, but
to impermissibly "mutate." Id.
75 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) [hereinafter TVPA].
76 See Gruzen, supra note 56, at 230-31 (describing TVPA's passage).
The law was a
reaction to the "confused analysis" of the Tel-Oren opinion. Id.
77 See id.
(discussing congressional objectives in passing TVPA). Gruzen writes Congress
addressed Judge Bork's objection that the ATS created no explicit cause of action. Id. at 231. In
passing the TVPA, Congress granted a cause of action for both U.S. and foreign citizens
victimized by torture. Id. It also clearly defined torture, thus eliminating the need for judges to
rely on ambiguous or non-binding sources of international law. Id. However, Gruzen also notes
several distinctions between the ATS and the TVPA. Id. at 232. First, the TVPA is restricted to
the torts of torture and extrajudicial killing. Id. Thus, it does not cover any other tort, such as
unlawful detention. Id. Second, the TVPA is limited to individual defendants acting under the
authority of a sovereign state, while the ATS leaves open the possibility of a non-state actor as
defendant. Id.; see also infra note 88 (describing Kadic holding). Finally, the TVPA includes a
provision requiring that the plaintiff exhaust all local remedies before proceeding with a claim
under this act. See Gruzen, supra note 56, at 232 (describing differences between TVPA and
ATS). The distinctions between the acts imply that not all cases arising under the ATS could be
brought under the TVPA. Id. at 233; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating "the scope of the Alien Tort Act remains undiminished by enactment of the Torture
Victim Act.").
78 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
79 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
8o See infra notes 81-86, 88 and accompanying text (discussing factual allegations, holdings,
and analyses of Forn and Kadic).
81 See Forn, 672 F. Supp. at 1536 (describing facts of case). In March of 1976, the Armed
Forces staged a coup d'etat and took the government from President Peron. Id. General SuarezMason was commander of the zone where the plaintiff lived. Id.
82 See id. at 1537 (noting allegations of complaint). The complaint alleges that the military
authorities also took all of the family's personal possessions, as well as several thousand dollars
in cash. Id. One of the plaintiffs was then blindfolded and held at a police station for a month,
deprived of communication to the outside world. Id. She was handcuffed with her hands behind
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defendant moved to dismiss the case, and a central issue was whether the
plaintiffs' prolonged detention constituted a tort in violation of the Law of
Nations.83 The court
found that the prolonged detention violated customary
84
international law.
In Kadic, Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina sued
the defendant for atrocities he ordered when he was leader of Bosnian
military forces.85 However, due to the armed conflict occurring in the
region, there was no recognized state where the defendant could be
considered a citizen.8 6 Thus, the court was tasked with determining
whether a non-state actor could be held liable for violating the ATS, as it
referenced only the "Law of Nations. ,8 7 While the district court ruled that
non-state actors could not be held liable under the ATS, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that the modem conception of
international law demanded that non-state actors and state actors alike were

her back for the first week of the detention. Id. The authorities did not give her either food or
clean clothing. Id. Another of the plaintiffs was severely beaten and then shot. Id.
83 See id. at 1541-42 (discussing count four in complaint). The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant held two of them "arbitrarily and without justification, cause or privilege," and that the
defendant "forcibly confined both plaintiff Benchoam and [Forti] for a prolonged period." Id. at
1541 (internal quotations omitted).
84 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding detention
violates international human rights norms). The court held that sufficient case law existed to hold
that arbitrary detention constituted a violation of CIL. Id. The court also went further, reasoning
that the consensus became even clearer in the case of a sovereign state detaining its own citizens
for a prolonged period of time. Id. at 1541-42. The court stated, "[t]he norm is obligatory, and is
readily definable in terms of the arbitrary character of the detention." Id. at 1542; see also Flom,
supra note 70, at 335 (discussing holding of Forti). The court found that prolonged, arbitrary
detention violated CIL because it was precisely definable. Id. But see Forti, 672 F. Supp. at
1543 (holding "cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" not within CIL or ATS because it is not
precisely definable).
85 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995) (providing basis for complaint).
The plaintiffs alleged the defendants committed the following atrocities as part of a systematic
genocidal campaign: rape; forced prostitution; forced impregnation; torture; and summary
execution. Id. at 236-37. The court referenced the district court decision, which granted
defendant's motion to dismiss, because "the members of Karadzic's faction do not act under the
color of any recognized state law." Id. at 237 (quoting Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 741
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
86 See id. at 236 (stating issues in cases). Judge Newman noted the case posed "significant
issues as to the scope of the Alien Tort Act," the most relevant of which included "whether some
violations of the law of nations may be remedied when committed by those not acting under the
authority of a state; [and] if so, whether genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are
among the violations that do not require state action... Id.; see also Gruzen, supra note 56, at
220 (calling Kadic "[p]erhaps the most significant post -Filartigadecision" in ATS jurisprudence
because it expanded ATS jurisdiction to non-state action).
87 See supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting reason for district court granting
defendant's motion to dismiss).
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liable under the ATS.88
In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 9 the
Supreme Court wrestled with the Alien Tort Statute. 90 This case involved
an Argentine military strike against a Liberian oil tanker during the Falkand
Islands War. 91 The tanker's owner, Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation,
filed suit against Argentina in United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York under the ATS. 92 The District Court dismissed the
complaint because they found that it conflicted with the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the
case, finding sufficient jurisdiction under the ATS. 93 The Supreme Court
held that the ATS does not grant plaintiffs jurisdiction over foreign
sovereign states. 94 Thus, for a successful claim to move forward, the suit

must be directed against either a state actor acting outside his official

88 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. Disagreeing with the circuit court's decision, the Second Circuit
rejected the proposition that "the law of nations, as understood in the modem era, confines its
reach to state action." Id. (providing prohibition against piracy as early example of application to
acts of private individuals); see also Gruzen, supra note 56, at 222 (stating significance of Kadic
decision). Gruzen noted that while susceptible to criticism, Kadic's significance lay in its central
holding that in certain circumstances, non-state actors could be international law violators, and
that official recognition of a state is not required. Id.; supra note 54 (citing Blackstone's writings
on piracy).
89 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
90 See Graham Ogilvy, Note, Belhas v. Ya'Alon: The Case For A Jus Cogens Exception to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 8 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 169, 173-75 (2009) (describing

procedural posture of Hess). After the Southern District Court of New York dismissed the case,
the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision. Id. at 174. The Supreme Court then
granted certiorari to determine how the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 intersected with
the ATS. Id. at 174-75.
91 See Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 431 (providing facts of case).
92 See id.
93 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976) [hereinafter FSIA]. The statute states in relevant part: "Subject
to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment
of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
and of the States ....

."

Id.; see also Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 433 (discussing circuit court

opinion). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that the Second Circuit viewed the
ATS as "no more than a jurisdictional grant based on international law," and Congress did not
enact the FSIA intending to eliminate existing remedies for international law violations.
Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 433.

94 See Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434-35 & n.3. The Court, in examining the FSIA's
structure and text, determined that Congress intended the statute to be the "sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state" in United States courts. Id. at 434. In regards to how
the FSIA interacts with the ATS, the Court implied that each statute dealt with a different
situation: the FSIA is applicable when a sovereign state is involved; the ATS applies when a
plaintiff wishes to sue an individual acting under the color of a sovereign state, or alternatively, a
non-state actor. Id. at 437. The Court noted Congress' failure to expressly repeal the ATS in
enacting the FSIA "speaks only faintly, if at all, to the issue involved in [Amerada Hess] ." Id.
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95
capacity, or against a non-state actor.
As the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first, the forces of
globalization allowed and encouraged the rise of non-state actors.96 The
1993 World Trade Center bombing, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, the
bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and most
notably, the events of September 11, 2001, revealed the threat of non-state
sponsored terrorism to both western democracies and the public
97
consciousness.

In response, the United States accelerated a counterterrorism,
' 98
counterintelligence program widely known as "extraordinary rendition. "
The heart of this program was rendering suspected terrorists to their nation
of origin for interrogation. 99 In several circumstances that have come to
light, government officials have interrogated detained individuals who have
provided no intelligence of any value to the U.S. government.100 In the
95 See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 436-37 (1989)
(discussing holding's effect on ATS). The Court implied that this decision may limit the ATS's
jurisdiction, but largely in the abstract. Id. Justice Rehnquist, discussing the jurisprudential
history, noted that the Court of Appeals "did not cite any decision in which a United States court
exercised jurisdiction over a foreign state under the Alien Tort Statute .... Id. at 436; see also
Holt, supra note 58, at 560-61 (discussing effect of Amerada Hess on ATS). Holt notes the
Court's holding does not directly affect the ATS, but merely limits its jurisdiction to preclude
suits against a foreign, sovereign state. Id.; see also Ogilvy, supra note 90, at 173-75 (analyzing
implications of Amerada Hess decision). While the decision clearly stated that jurisdiction for a
suit against a sovereign state could come only from the FSIA, the ATS "could be interpreted so as
to grant jurisdiction over foreign, non-sovereign defendants, while the FSIA conferred
jurisdiction over foreign states." Ogilvy, supra note 90, at 173-75. But see Gruzen, supra note
56, at 227-30 (discussing effect of Amerada Hess on human rights litigation). Gruzen theorized
that this decision "severely curtailed the use of the Alien Tort Statute as a human rights tool." Id.
at 228.
96 See generally PHIL WILLIAMS, INT'L RELATIONS & SECURITY, Violent Non -State Actors
and Nationaland InternationalSecurity Zurich (2008).
97 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 1135 (discussing impact of September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks). Following the September 11 attacks, the United States entered a new era of national
security. Id.
98 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (outlining rise of extraordinary rendition
program).
99 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (outlining use of extraordinary rendition
program); see also Lucien J. Dhooge, The State Secrets Privilege And Corporate Complicity In
ExtraordinaryRendition, 37 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 469, 473 (2009) (providing background on
extraordinary rendition program). The CIA removed high value targets from the states where
they were found to locations such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Thailand, and
Uzbekistan. Dhooge, supra, at 473. In these locations, the targets were subjected to detention
and interrogation methods, allegedly in violation of both U.S. law and international standards. Id.
The nations allowing extraordinary rendition to occur included Bosnia, Canada, Indonesia, Iraq,
Italy, Macedonia, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 473 n. 17.
100 See Peter Johnston, Note, Leaving The Invisible Universe: Why All Victims of
ExtraordinaryRendition Need a Cause ofAction Against the United States, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 357,
375-76 (2007) (citing cases of innocent individuals tortured after extraordinary rendition).
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span of twenty-five years, the ATS has gone from an historical footnote to
a key weapon in detainees' struggles to hold those actors responsible for
the harms perpetrated against them. 101 As innocent victims of both foreign
and domestic interrogation programs emerge and seek remedies for their
harms suffered in U.S. courts, there
is perhaps no bigger hurdle to leap than
02
that of the state secrets privilege.
C. From Shield to Sword: The State Secrets Privilege

Like the Alien Tort Statute, the state secrets privilege can be traced
back to the nascent days of American government, though it has its roots in
English common law. 1 3 United States. v. Burr,10 4 the first notable case in
the United States, involved the treason trial of Aaron Burr. 105 There, Burr

attempted to force the prosecution to produce a letter between President
Jefferson and General Wilkinson. 0 6 Burr asserted that the letter contained
information that would aid his defense. 107 Chief Justice John Marshall
overruled the prosecution's objection by noting "[t]here is certainly nothing
Johnston cites the case of Maher Arar, who was extraordinarily rendered and tortured based on
false intelligence. Id. at 375 n.106. Johnston also cites the case of Ibn al Sheikh al Libi, "one of
the greatest intelligence failures in American history," as someone whom the CIA rendered,
waterboarded, and turned over to Egypt, where he was buried alive for seventeen hours. Id. at
375-76. After this treatment, al Libi confessed to being a member of al-Qaeda, and gave the CIA
information regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction ("WMD") program. Id. at 376. ThenSecretary of State Colin Powell used some of al Libi's statements at his United Nations
presentation to help make the case that Iraq was pursuing a WMD program. Id. In 2004, al Libi
recanted his statements, claiming he gave them only because he was being tortured. Id.
101See, e.g., Alohamed II, 579 F.3d 943, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing allegations in
case); Aar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565-67 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing allegations in case); ElMasri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing allegations in case).
102 See infra note 103 and accompanying text (describing consequence of successful
invocation of privilege).
103 See Glasionov, supra note 9, at 461 (explaining history of state secrets privilege). The
precursor to the common law privilege is the English "crown privilege." Id. This privilege
allowed the monarch's ministers to keep communications private if the subject matter referred to
state secrets. Id.; see also Kristian W. Murray, NationalSecurity Veiled in Secrecy: an Analysis
of the State Secrets Privilege in National Security Agency Wiretapping Litigation, 199 MIL. L.

REV. 1, 6-7 (2009) (describing history of privilege). The privilege was notably used in the trial of
Bishop Atterbury on treason and sedition charges in 1723. Id. at 7. Atterbury, to prove his
innocence, wanted to examine the cryptographers who had decoded his messages alleged to be
treasonous. Id. The House of Lords denied his request, however, because they thought
information that revealed the methods by which the messages were decoded would threaten
England's national security. Id.
104 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.Va. 1807) (No. 14692D).
105 See Glasionov, supra note 9, at 461 (stating root of privilege in American law goes back
to Burr proceeding).
106 Id. (describing facts of Burr case).
107 See id. (describing facts of case).
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before the court which shows that the letter in question contains any matter
the disclosure of which would endanger the public safety."108 In overruling
the objection, however, Chief Justice Marshall implied that when national
security was at stake, courts could keep government information hidden
from public disclosure. 109
The next case of note was Totten v. United States"0 in 1875.111
The case involved the estate of a deceased spy that sued the United States
for breaching a compensation contract between the spy and the
government.1 2 The Supreme Court dismissed the case, holding that while
a secret contract between the government and a private actor could exist,
the private actor had no cause of action on that contract if the very subject
matter of the case-the secret contract-could not be disclosed in court. 113
This case established the Totten doctrine, whereby a case merited dismissal
before trial if the case's subject matter was that which the government
could not litigate without threatening national security or military
necessity. 114

108Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37 (responding to prosecution's objection).
109 See id. (noting if letter had, hypothetically, contained information threatening national

security, it would be suppressed). Chief Justice Marshall wrote that while balancing national
security against an individual's right to his own defense presented "adelicate question, the
discussion of which, it is hoped, will never be rendered necessary in this country," if the letter did
contain "any matter which it would be imprudent to disclose, which it is not the wish of the
executive to disclose, such matter ...will, of course, be suppressed." Id.
110 92 U.S. 105 (1875).

III See Crook, supra note 14, at 58 (noting Totten was first time state secrets privilege was
used in American jurisprudence).
112 See Totten, 92 U.S. at 105 (stating facts of case). The plaintiff, William Lloyd, allegedly
made a contract with President Lincoln in 1861 requiring Lloyd to perform reconnaissance and
determine Confederate troop numbers in various locations. Id.In return, he was to be paid, by
the Union, $200 per month. Id.at 106.
113See id. at 107. The Court wrote, "[t]he secrecy which such contracts impose precludes
any action for their enforcement." Id.; see also Murray, supra note 103, at 8-9 (discussing
implications of Totten ruling). The Court's ruling in this case was the first time national security
was used as a rationale to preclude the disclosure of evidence. Murray, supra note 103, at 8.
114See Totten, 92 U.S. at 107 (stating Court's rationale for holding). Justice Field wrote:
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the maintenance of
any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure
of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not
allow the confidence to be violated.
Id.;
see also Afohamed III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2010) (analyzing Totten in context of
plaintiff's claims). The court noted the bar "has evolved into the principle that where the very
subject matter of a lawsuit is a matter of state secret, the action must be dismissed without
reaching the question of evidence." Id. (quoting Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507
F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007)). But see id. at 1096-97 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (noting
extremely limited application of Totten). While conceding that the majority correctly stated the
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In United States v. Reynolds," 5 the Court issued an alternative
formulation of the privilege."16 In this case, an Air Force B-29 bomber
tasked with testing secret electronic systems crashed, killing several crew
members." 7 The crewmembers' widows sued the government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act." 8 The plaintiffs sought to compel production of
the accident reports, as well as the statements of the surviving crew. 119 The
Secretary of the Air Force filed a claim of privilege with the court, and the
Judge Advocate General of the Air Force filed a sworn affidavit.120 Both
documents testified to the highly secretive nature of the information
contained within the accident report. 121 Because the government refused to
provide the documentation, the district court entered a default judgment for
22
the plaintiffs, which the appeals court upheld. 1
However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
government had asserted a proper claim of privilege. 123 In doing so, the

Totten language, Justice Hawkins emphasized that the bar has only been applied in two extremely
limited scenarios: (1) when the plaintiff is party to a secret agreement with the government; and
(2) when the plaintiff sues to solicit information from the government regarding state secrets. Id.;
see also Murray, supra note 103, at 9 (noting Totten aftermath). The case established a precedent
whereby covert contracts could be barred from litigation based on national security concerns.
Murary, supranote 103, at 9; see also Crook, supra note 14, at 59 (noting holding's significance).
Notably, the plaintiff's case was not dismissed because it had disclosed confidential information.
Id. Rather, the case was dismissed because it had "the mere possibility of doing so." Id.
(emphasis added).
115 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
116 See Glasionov, supra note 9, at 463 (noting Reynolds was first explicit mention of state
secrets privilege). Reynolds still serves as the modem, more common assertion of the privilege,
as it deals directly with the U.S. government seeking to forbid the production of evidence based
on national security concerns. Id.
117 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2-3 (stating facts of case).
118 Id. at 3.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 3-4 (discussing procedural posture of case). The government, in moving to quash
the motion, claimed that the matters invoked confidential Air Force regulations. Id.; see also
Murray, supra note 103, at 10 (stating facts of case). The Judge Advocate General of the Air
Force also submitted an affidavit positing that the release of the information would seriously
compromise flying safety, national security, and equipment development. Murray, supra note
103, at 10.
121 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 4-5 (discussing lower court posture).
The documents
emphasized that the aircraft and soldiers were "engaged in a highly secret mission of the Air
Force," and that exposing the information during the discovery would threaten national security.
Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). The government did offer to allow the three surviving
witnesses to testify to anything other than matters of a classified nature. Id. at 5.
122 See Crook, supra note 14, at 59-61 (explaining how Reynolds reached Supreme Court).
Because the Air Force refused to turn over the documents, the district court entered a final
judgment for the plaintiffs. Id. at 61. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied the Air Force's
appeal. Id.
123 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953) (stating holding of case). The suit
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Court recognized the implications of its ruling. 124 It laid out several
important requirements necessary for the government to assert a claim of
privilege over state secrets.12 5 First, the Court noted that the trial judge was
not properly able to evaluate the degree of confidentiality of the materials
sought for production. 126 Therefore, there must first be a formal claim of
privilege, "lodged by the head of the department which has control over the
matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. ' , 127 Next, the
court must then determine "whether the circumstances are appropriate for
the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect."1 28 This desire to strike
29 a
balance led to the Court's formulation of the "reasonable danger" test. 1
was brought under the Tort Claims Act. Id. The lower court held that under Rule 34 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which compels document production of non -privileged matters,
the Government was liable. Id. However, the Court ruled that because the Government's claim
of privilege was proper, it precluded disclosure of the documents plaintiff sought. Id. Thus, the
district court had incorrectly assigned liability to the Air Force. Id.
124 See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302-03 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing history
of
state secrets privilege). The court in El -Afasri noted the Reynolds court itself suggested the state
secrets privilege was designed to avoid the constitutional implications of the judiciary demanding
information that the executive branch refused to provide. Id. at 302-03. El-Afasri also noted the
limited role the judiciary has traditionally played in placing a check on the executive's foreign
policy role. Id.; see also Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8 (discussing difficulty in applying privilege).
However, the Court in Reynolds also realized that "j]udicial control over the evidence in a case
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10. The Court
analogized the state secrets privilege to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. at 8. The Court recognized that in that situation, where there is too much inquiry the privilege
becomes useless. Id. Conversely, a "complete abandonment" of any inquiry at all would lead to
"intolerable abuses." Id.; see also Crook, supra note 14, at 61 (analyzing the Reynolds holding).
The Court in Reynolds realized that there exists an inherent conflict between the threat of
disclosing secret military matters and the ability of a plaintiff to try a case on its merits. Crook,
supra note 14, at 61; Page, supra note 10, at 1250 (analyzing impact of Reynolds). The Court
reversed the Third Circuit, although it did uphold the appellate court's ruling that it was the
judiciary, not the executive, who ultimately must decide whether the privilege applies. Page,
supra note 10, at 1250.
125 See infra notes 126-132 and accompanying text (discussing framework of Reynolds
decision).
126 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10 (explaining logistics of privilege's application). The Court
reversed the district court, at the same time noting that until a formal claim of privilege was
lodged, the district court judge was in no position to declare the accident report as beyond the
reach of the plaintiff. Id. The Court further implied, however, that a mere invocation of the
privilege would be enough for a district judge to rule that the plaintiffs could not access the
document. Id. at 10-11.
127 Id. at 7-8; see also Page, supra note 10, at 1255 (noting private party cannot claim
or
invoke privilege).
128 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8. The Court invoked the Fifth Amendment claim against selfincrimination as an analogous analytical framework due to the "real difficulty" of determining the
appropriate level of inquiry. Id.
129 See id. at 10 (discussing how to determine proper invocation of privilege). Along with
the three part test, the Court put forth language from which all modem cases have drawn:
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Finally, the Court noted the strength of the privilege, holding "the
claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the most
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is
ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake."' 30 As such, the Court
was able to provide guidance to future claimants of the privilege regarding
both the substantive and procedural requirements, while reaffirming that
the privilege's successful invocation resulted in immediate dismissal of the
plaintiffs claim. 3 ' Thus, the state secrets privilege exists on a dual plane:
either under the Totten bar, whereby a court must dismiss a claim if the
very subject matter of the litigation is a state secret, or under the Reynolds
evidentiary privilege, whereby courts must determine whether evidence
32
involved in the litigation is subject to protection from the privilege. 1
After the September 11 attacks, the United States drastically
increased its counterterrorism operations, and the state secrets privilege
took on a more visible role in the legal field. 33 Instead of merely asserting
the evidentiary privilege when the government was sued, the United States
began proactively intervening in cases where it was not named as a
defendant, claiming the subject of the lawsuit would frustrate and threaten
national security measures. 134 While the Obama administration established
policies that theoretically would restrict its assertion of the state secrets
privilege, in practice, it has continued the Bush administration's policies of
seeking dismissal during the pleading stages in cases where both U.S. and
foreign nationals were abducted, detained, and tortured. 135

It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there
is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this is the
case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize
the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of
the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.
Id.
130
131

Id. at 11.
See id. (implying dismissal will result when government properly satisfies
"reasonable

danger" test).
132 See supra notes 113, 123 and accompanying text (describing holdings of Totten and
Reynolds).
133

See supra note 8 (describing evolution of state
secrets privilege incontext of post-

September 11, 2001 counterterrorism landscape).
134

See Mohamed II, 579 F.3d 943, 951 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting United States intervened

before defendant Jeppesen answered complaint). The state
secrets privilege inthis case was
asserted by the then-Director of the CIA, Michael Hayden. Id. He filed two statements in
support of a motion to dismiss, one classified, and the other unclassified. Id.
135 See Mohamed III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating procedural posture of
case); supra note 13 and accompanying text (detailing Holder memo policies effective October 1,
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These two recent, notable cases clearly elucidate not only the
executive branch's determination to acquire the dismissal of all cases of
extraordinary rendition and torture, but also evidence the judicial branch's
excessive deference to both the Bush and Obama administrations'
efforts. 36
They are El-Masri v. United States, 37 as well as the
aforementioned Mohamed (both 11 and II1)138 The two cases are factually
very similar. Both involve CIA detention, transfer by corporate
charter,
39
1
interrogation.
and
torture
including
detention
foreign
and
El-Masri, confined by the limits of the ATS under Amerada Hess,
brought suit not against any sovereign nation, but against George Tenet,
then-CIA Director, and a number of private companies that he alleged were
complicit in his detention and torture. 140 The United States, not a party to

the case, then filed a statement of interest, asserting the state secrets
141
privilege, and moving to have the case dismissed.
The district court
42
1
upheld the government's motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit conducted an exhaustive analysis of
the privilege. 143 After determining that the claim of privilege was properly

asserted, it stated that the government bears the burden of proving that the
Reynolds standard-whether "there is a reasonable danger that [the
information's] disclosure will expose military matters which.., should not

2009). The Obama administration certified both in its briefs and at oral argument during
rehearing that "officials at the highest levels of the Department of Justice of the new
administration had reviewed the assertion of privilege in this case and determined that it was
appropriate.
...
" Alohamed III, 614 F.3d at 1077; Brief of Appellee-Defendant Neal Kumar
Katyal, Acting Solicitor General at 1, Aar v. Ashcroft, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010) (No. 09-923),
2010 WL 1932623 at *1.
136 See supra notes 134, 135 and accompanying text (describing executive branch efforts to
achieve dismissal).
137 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
138See El-Alasri, 479 F.3d at 300 (discussing facts of case); supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text (describing allegations of Afohamed plaintiffs). El-Masri was a German
citizen of Lebanese descent. El-Afasri, 479 F.3d at 300. He was traveling in Macedonia on
December 31, 2003, when Macedonian law enforcement arrested him. Id. After transfer to CIA
agents, the CIA detained him near Kabul, Afghanistan until May 28, 2004. Id. During his
captivity, he alleges he was "beaten, drugged, bound, and blindfolded during transport; confined
in a small, unsanitary cell, interrogated ... and consistently prevented from communicating with
anyone outside the detention facility." Id. El-Masri further alleges the corporate defendants
named in the suit, Premier Executive Transport Services and Keeler & Tate Management Group,
LLC, provided the transport during El-Masri's extraordinary rendition. Id.
139 See supra note 138 and accompanying text (outlining allegations in El-Afasri complaint).
140See El3fasri, 479 F.3d at 301.
141See id. at 301 (discussing case's procedural posture).
142 See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2007).
143See id. at 302-07 (reviewing evolution of privilege).
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be divulged.', 144 Here, because the subject of the suit centered on the
United States's policy of extraordinary rendition and interrogation of
terrorist suspects, the court found that the case could not be litigated, and
dismissal was appropriate. 145
When the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded Mohamed I, it
created a circuit split regarding when the state secrets privilege can be
used. 146 While the El-Masri decision allowed the Reynolds test to be used
to dismiss an entire lawsuit at the pleadings stage (essentially achieving a
confluence of the Reynolds and Totten standards), the Ninth Circuit
disagreed. 147 Mohamed II emphasized that "to conclude that Reynolds, like
Totten, applies to prevent the litigation of allegations, rather than simply
discovery of evidence, would be to destroy the distinction between the two
versions of the doctrine.', 148 The court also addressed the separation of
powers issues raised by the government's assertion of the privilege at the
pleadings stage. 149 It stated a strong preference for analyzing state secrets
claims under the auspices of the Reynolds framework rather than under the
Totten bar. 150 The Mohamed II decision by the en banc Ninth Circuit
validated the Mohamed I court's fears of destroying the distinction between
the Reynolds and Totten analyses, and of according too much deference to
1
the executive branch's claims of secrecy. i'
Mohamed III's holding is
144

Id. at 302 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).

145See id. at 312-13 (stating case's holding).
146

See supra note 34 and accompanying text (stating nature of circuit split).

147See id. at 957-58 (analyzing purpose and nature of evidentiary privileges). The court held

the Reynolds privilege operated no differently than any other privilege, and it "extends only to
[evidence] and not to facts." Id. at 957 (citations omitted). Consequently, "itcannot be invoked
to prevent a litigant ... of the truth or falsity of an allegation by reference to non -privileged
evidence, regardless whether privileged evidence might also be probative of the truth or falsity of
the allegation." Id. at 957-58.
148 Mfohamed 11, 579 F.3d at 957 (analyzing implications of government's claim in context of
Reynolds standard).

149 See id. at 956 (noting "[s]eparation-of-powers concerns take on an especially important
role in the context of secret Executive conduct.").
150See id. (discussing separation of powers issues raised by state secrets privilege). The
court noted when individual civil liberties are at stake, the Constitution "most assuredly envisions
a role for all three branches .... Id. Whereas the Totten framework allows the executive branch
total immunity from judicial scrutiny, analyzing the privilege under the Reynolds standard
preserves separation of powers concerns by allowing a more precise examination. Id.
151 See Mohamed 111, 614 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing prospective paths of
litigation). The court concluded while "some information" about the extraordinary rendition
program has been made public, and this public information would allow the plaintiffs' claims, if
true, to make out a prima facie case against Jeppesen, "Jeppesen's alleged role and attendant
liability cannot be isolated from aspects that are secret and protected. Because the facts
underlying plaintiffs' claims are so infused with these secrets, any plausible effort by Jeppesen to
defend against them would create an unjustifiable risk of revealing state secrets ....
" Id. at 1088
(emphasis added).
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significant because it not only eliminated this circuit split, but it also
affirmed a deferential posture toward the executive branch by holding that
a defendant could assert an evidentiary privilege at the pleadings stage, and
achieve dismissal of the entire case. 15 2 Furthermore, the court implies that
though the rendition program is no longer a state secret, that while the
government itself has disclosed the program's existence, the circumstances
of its use and abuse may not be litigated using publicly available
information.' 53 Effectively, the Ninth Circuit's decision serves to bar a
plaintiffs claim on evidentiary grounds, even when the plaintiff can make
a prima facie case using publicly available information, simply due to the
risk that the discovery process may unearth a state secret. 154
IV. ANALYSIS: FORGING AHEAD
While the state secrets privilege serves an important role, the
deference accorded by courts to the executive branch represents an
abdication of judicial authority and review that has empowered the
executive branch to assert the privilege in increasingly broader contexts."'
Despite promises of more careful review and the implementation of the
privilege, the Obama administration has extended the Bush
administration's use of it. 156 When the executive branch oversteps its
constitutional boundaries, the responsibility falls upon the judiciary and the
legislature to rein in its excesses. i 7 The logical question becomes how
these branches can do so, and allow innocent individuals properly to be
made whole for violations of international and domestic law committed by

152

Id. (holding executive branch properly invoked Reynolds state secrets privilege during

pleadings stage).
153 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
154 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953) (holding state secrets
privilege was valid); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissing case
based on valid assertion of state secrets privilege); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.
(Mfohamed 1), 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev'd, 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding privilege may be asserted at pleadings stage using Reynolds test to achieve dismissal);
see also supra note 13 (citing Obama administration's use of privilege preventing disclosure of
assassination of U.S. citizen in Yemen).
156 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing recent Washington Post article).
157 See Mfohamed III, 614 F.3d at 1101 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's
suggested remedies for plaintiffs). The majority suggested "that the Executive could 'honor [ ]
the fundamental principles of justice' by 'determining whether plaintiffs' claims have merit' and
compensating them on a case-by-case basis. Id. The dissent rebuts this, stating that allowing the
executive branch to police itself "disregards the concept of checks and balances" and "deprive[s]
the judiciary of its role." Id.
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the United States. 5 "
A. Continue Bringing Claims Under ATS
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,159 Justice Souter's opinion indicated
the potential for future human rights victims to bring an ATS suit, but
endorsed a narrow construction of the statute that granted jurisdiction but
provided no cause of action. 160 While the Torture Victim Protection Act
may be a useful tool, there is less case law under this statute and thus a lack
of certainty as to how a plaintiff may successfully bring a claim. 161 The
ATS also allows courts to be flexible and incrementalist in determining
what customary international law norms should be accorded: CIL or jus
cogens status. 6 2 The Kadic decision has already established that the statute
163
can be applied flexibly while still adhering to the drafters' intentions.
Finally, the statute is flexible because it evolves as the body of international
law itself evolves. 164 Not only is international law expanding, it is
becoming more clearly defined from both a procedural and a substantive
perspective. 165 As such, torture and extraordinary rendition victims should
continue to keep the ATS as a prominent tool in their arsenal. 166 If any
silver lining exists in the Mohamed III decision, it is the court's failure to
question the Ninth Circuit's ability to acquire jurisdiction over the matter

158 See supra note 155 and accompanying text (describing increasingly broader use of state
secrets privilege).
159 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
160 See id. at 724 (holding ATS as "jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action").
However, the majority opinion did not end its inquiry there. Responding to Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion, the majority wrote:

Whereas Justice Scalia sees these developments as sufficient to close the door to
further independent judicial recognition of actionable international norms, other
considerations persuade us that the judicial power should be exercised on the
understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open
to a narrow class of international norms today.

Id. at 729.
161
162

See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (describing legislative history of TVPA).
See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (analyzing Supreme Court's construction

of ATS).
163

See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing Kadic holding).

164

See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (implying Law of Nations may adapt when

CIL changes).
165 See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text (analyzing evolution of CIL).
166 See supra note 88 (explaining that ATS grants jurisdiction and may encompass certain
violations of international law).
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through the ATS. 167 As its usage grows, the challenges to its legitimacy
68
should diminish. 1
B. Pass the "State Secrets ProtectionAct of 2009"
While plaintiffs may continue bringing suits under the ATS, the
United States has clearly indicated that even a whiff of its potential
involvement will trigger a state secrets privilege claim.169 The mere fact
that the government has asserted the privilege does not guarantee that the
matter is truly a matter of state secrets. 170 While the Reynolds court
strongly implied that in camera reviews would be inappropriate, it is the
lack of transparency in the process, along with the aforementioned
revelations, that has created a lack of faith in the government's
assertions. 171 Plaintiffs' cases are being dismissed without the case getting
to the discovery stage, much less a trial on the merits. 172
Instead of requiring a judge to take the government's word, based
only on a "reasonable" danger, Congress should pass the State Secrets Act
of 2009, which would go far in narrowing the executive branch's ability to
assert the state secrets privilege. 173 Not only does it require in camera
examinations by the presiding judge, but it also prohibits the application of
the Reynolds standard during the pleadings stage. 174 While the in camera
examination would contravene a strong implication of the Reynolds
decision, it would, more importantly, keep with the larger spirit of allowing
a judge to balance more precisely the information that truly threatens
national security protocols and that information which both the plaintiff
and the defendant can use to adjudicate the merits of their respective

167

See Aflohamed III, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (omitting discussion of jurisdiction).

168

See supra note 167.

169 See Alohamed II, 579 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting the United States intervened

as defendant before Jeppesen had answered complaint).
170 See Glasionov, supra note 9, at 466 (discussing "ironic twist" in Reynolds). The report
that the government sought to keep classified, based on information regarding secret electronic
equipment, was recently declassified. Id. Contrary to the government's assertion of what the
report contained, it in fact attributed the crash to the military's negligence. Id. Thus, Reynolds,
the landmark case outlining the state secrets privilege, was itself based on wrongly concealed
information. Id.
171

Id. at 467-68.

172 See id. at 469 (noting effect of successful claim of privilege is dismissal at pleadings

stage).
173
174

H.R. 984, 11lth Cong. (2009); S.417, 11lth Cong. (2009).
Cf United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) ("The court should not jeopardize

the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the
evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.").
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claims. 175 By introducing a greater level of transparency, those lawsuits
that are dismissed will garner far more credibility and avoid the situation
presented in Reynolds.176 Furthermore, in camera reviews will introduce a
level of procedural integrity that dovetails with the executive branch's
77
renewed focus on respect for international law. 1
Both the Ninth Circuit, in Mohamed II and III, as well as the
Fourth Circuit, in El-Masri, expressed a reluctance to invoke the Totten bar
beyond its present scope. 78 Prohibiting the dismissal at the pleadings stage
using the Reynolds analysis will force the executive to identify specific
pieces of evidence it seeks to avoid disclosing. 179 The House version was
reported out of committee favorably, but the full House did not vote on the
bill before it recessed.' 8 ° The State Secrets Protection Act of 2009 should
be refiled during the next legislative session and passed into law, as it
makes significant strides toward restoring the state secrets privilege as a
shield, rather than a sword.' 8 '
C. Carefully Select Appellate Jurisdiction
Until Mohamed I, no recent case, in which extraordinary rendition
and torture were at stake, survived the invocation of the state secrets
82

privilege. 1

The Fourth Circuit seems a likely circuit to avoid, based on the
similar facts presented in El-Masri. 83 Although in that case the defendant
was not a private company, but rather the U.S. government, the court
dismissed the claim. 184 Despite widely available public documents on the
nature of the plaintiffs rendition, the court found that the "main avenues"
of the government's defense would be precluded by vital national security

175

See supra note 174 and accompanying text.

176See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text (explaining Reynolds reasoning and

standard).
177 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
179 See H.R. 984, § 7(c) (2009) (prohibiting dismissal at pleadings stage).
180 H.R. 984 (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Nov. 5th, 2009).
181 See generally H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 417, 111th Cong.
(2009).
182 See Mfohamed II, 579 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating conclusion of opinion). The
court noted in this case that Jeppesen had not yet filed an answer to the complaint, and on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the court will inquire only as to whether the complaint "'state[s] a claim upon
which relief can be granted."' Id. at 960-61 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)) Because the
plaintiffs here did not state such a claim, the court denied the government's motion to dismiss.
Id. at 960-61.
183 See supra note 138 (discussing facts of El-Afasri).
184 See supra note 13 8 (discussing facts and holding of El-Afasri).
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information. 8 5 They also implied they would rule the same way if there
was a corporate defendant in place of the government. 186
Even after its decision in Mohamed III, the Ninth Circuit remains
the most likely forum in which to bring torture and rendition claims that
violate the ATS. 87 While this does not guarantee that each case filed will
get to trial, it is a forum in which plaintiffs can expect to find a more
willing audience. 88 The court noted the "reluctance" of its decision and
voted 6-5 in favor of the defendant.' 89 If the next plaintiff is able to

convince even one justice to switch his or her vote, then the cases have a
much greater chance of ultimately getting either to the pleadings stage, or
being granted certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.
D. Rely on Non-TraditionalMedia Reporting
In El-Masri, the court refused to acknowledge the reliability of
non-legal journalism. 190 Yet, up to this point, such media's veracity has
never been disputed. 191 Courts should consider not only governmental
materials and statements, but also the information available in the public

domain.192 To assert the state secrets privilege, the government is forced to
reveal very little of the information it seeks to protect. 193 Considering news
reports, public statements, and interviews can help paint a clearer picture of
the evidence a lawsuit is likely to extrapolate. 194

185

El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 309 (4th Cir. 2007).

186See id. at 310 (noting "[s]imilar concerns would attach to evidence produced in defense of
the corporate defendants").
187 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing holding of Alohamed I).
188 See supra notes 151-152 (analyzing effect of Afohamed III decision).
189 See Afohamed III, 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (listing vote count and "reluctantly
conclud[ing] ... plaintiffs' action must be dismissed").
190 See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 309 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Hepting v.
AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 986-990 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (discussing impact of numerous
media reports without disputing reliability).
191 See id. at 990 (suggesting factors of reliability to be considered by courts). "[T]he court
should look only at publicly reported information that possesses substantial indicia of reliability
and whose verification or substantiation possesses the potential to endanger national security."
Id.
192 See supra note 191 and accompanying text (analyzing courts' treatment of media reports).
193 See supra note 126 (describing logistics of asserting state secrets privilege).
194 See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 990-92 (describing publicly available documents and
reports regarding government wiretapping program).
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V. CONCLUSION
It is patently illogical to concede that the U.S. government may
assert a privilege designed to safeguard national security when that very
security allegedly rests on performing acts apposite with compacts, treaties,
and domestic statutes of which it has been both a party and a sponsor. The
post-September 11, 2001 paradigm requires vigilant counterterrorist and
counterintelligence operations. At the same time, no nation should be
immune from acknowledging its errors, particularly when it attempts to
hold other nations accountable for the very same actions. The Alien Tort
Statute provides a valuable tool for victims of human rights violations to
gain redress for unthinkable harms perpetrated against them. Certainly, the
U.S. government has legitimate and pressing reasons to safeguard our
intelligence processes. That it has successfully avoided an attack on
American soil since September 11, 2001 is a strong testament to the
dedication and efficacy of these processes. However, the state secrets
privilege has become a catch-all, handcuffing a judge's ability to determine
what evidence should rightfully be excluded on national security grounds
and what would reasonably give a plaintiff the proper ability to present a
case. Furthermore, courts must cease deferring to the executive branch as a
matter of course. Many of the cases plaintiffs have sought to bring pose
reasonable questions about exactly how much of the U.S. intelligence
process is actually covert and secret. Throughout its existence, the United
States has served as a clarion call to freedom, liberty, and the rule of law.
Its frequent application of the state secrets privilege undermines those most
essential values.
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